Dr. Vaknin Experiments on Human Subjects (aka Students)

Uploaded 9/24/2020, approx. 7 minute read

Summary

The professor discusses the concept of shared psychosis and how it is impossible to convince someone or a group that a hallucination is not real. He uses an example of two people feeling wet to explain that people cannot know if they experience things the same way. The professor concludes that people are not identical machines and that it is impossible to know if someone experiences things the same way as you do.

I want you to prove to me that you are real.

I can’t say me, you can hear me. I can’t touch you, you can’t touch me. Maybe you can feel something about me or how about you.

You heard of course of hallucinations.

Yes.

So maybe I am hallucinating that you are here. I am hallucinating that you are touching me. I am hallucinating.

I think it is your magic of fault.

So Lydia is trying to convince me that she is real, and she says that I see her.

But we have hallucinations where people think that they see something and they are not there.

So Lydia, she says that I can touch her and we have type of hallucinations that is called tactile hallucinations where we can touch something and it is not there.

She says I can hear her and of course the most common form of hallucinations is auditory hallucinations where we can hear voices but they are not there.

Including voices that tell us to give our family and we give our family, but there was lots of words.

So auditory hallucinations, tactile hallucinations, visual hallucinations that this stage are not convinced that you are real.

So Lydia, can you find something that will convince me completely that you are real? Beyond doubt, not possible to be a hallucination?

No.

So the sultana is on?

No, I am not vouching for any interest in the system.

I am not convinced that you are real.

You told me that I can see it.

Not convinced.

You told me that I can touch it.

Not convinced.

I told you that I can hear you, not from this.

Do you have anything that we convinced you that you are real?

New ones. I have to be real.

Do I want you to be real?

Oh, yeah. Or you don’t want me to.

If I want you to be real, it makes things even worse.

Because it…

Maybe you’re real, I’m adding a little bit.

What we call volunteerism.


So, the thing is, the thing is this.

There is no way she can convince you that she’s real.

One on one, or one on many, it doesn’t matter.

Because there is something called shared psychosis.

Where a group of people develop common hallucinations to all of them.

So, there is no way to convince me or you as a group that she’s real.

Since you are not real, you can be real.

You and you for the posture.

Megan. Put up your hands.

One on one side. One on one.

What is she feeling?

What is she feeling in her head?

Cold water. Cold water, wet.

Wet. Cold water, wet.

And what is she feeling?

I’ll do it, I’ll do it.

I feel the same.

How do you know that you feel the same?

I feel that too.

You feel it.

How do you know that he feels it?

Same water, yes, but are you the same person?

So, how do you know anything about him?

Same water. Same water, yes, but are you the same person?

Are you him?

Is he you?

So, how do you know anything about him?

Think.

How do you know he has water, you have water, and you say he’s feeling, how do you know what he’s feeling?

You don’t know.

You said that he’s feeling wet.

You said that she’s feeling…

You said that she’s feeling…

You said that she’s feeling wet.

How do you know that when she’s feeling wet, it is the same like you’re feeling wet?

Okay, you’re feeling wet, she’s feeling wet.

How do you know it is the same feeling?

No one tells me.

But how do you know that she is feeling wet like you are feeling wet?

How do you know she’s the same feeling?

She’s the only person with normal feelings. She’s a person, and you’re a person. That’s common basis.

So, tell me, are you the same person? You’re a person, are you the same person?

No.

So, how do you know that her wetness is your wetness? How do you know that the wave, the wave, that she knows, that she feels wet, is the same wave that you feel wet?

Because I know that she’s a normal, with normal feelings.

So, what you’re saying is this.

Actually, let me translate you.

You’re saying we are two identical machines. We are the same machines. We are machines with programming to react in certain ways, and you’re saying we are identical, because look, if you are not identical, you cannot know anything about her. If you are not identical in every beat, every iota, every atone, every molecule, if you are not exactly the same, you cannot know how she feels wet.

But if you are identical, if you have two copies of the same machine, iPhone 6, right?

Machines are the same. Even machines are not the same. If you ever work with machines, you don’t know each machine has its own personality.

But okay, machines are the same.

If I take my laptop to this technician, that technician, that technician, that technician, you don’t know what to do. Machines are the same.

Are people machines? How do you know that she feels wet, like you feel wet?

The answer is you don’t know. You don’t know. You don’t know that she feels, we will never know. You don’t know that she feels wet the same way. You don’t know that she feels thin the same way. You don’t know that she sees the color red the same way like you.

You can agree to call this, red.

But that’s it. You don’t know that she experiences red the same way you experienced red.

There is Dactonism, colored lines, two people looking at red, they will both call it red, but the Dactonist experiences red differently, so we don’t know.

Thank you.